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A Challenge for New Defenders of the Doctrine of Double Effect
Mark McBride ECENTLY, RALPH WEDGWOOD (forthcoming) has offered a defense of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) -a doctrine claimed by its defenders to explain our intuitions concerning the relevance of intention to the moral permissibility of actions. 1 My initial focus is not on his substantive defense of DDE, but rather on his formulation of DDE and of the success-conditions for a defense thereof. Wedgwood offers two formulations of DDE of different logical strength; endorses the weaker formulation (WDDE); and takes that formulation to be untouched by counterexamples to the stronger formulation (SDDE). Fine. But it has not been recognized that WDDE faces a difficult explanatory challenge -a challenge not faced by SDDE. Defending WDDE is no easy matter; in fact, curiously, in one respect it is harder than defending SDDE. Resultantly, opponents of DDE (see -notably -Foot 1978 , Thomson 1985 , 1991 , 1999 and Scanlon 2008 need not be unduly concerned by its new defenders' arguments.
Formulating DDE and Success-conditions for a Defense Thereof
Consider: (SDDE) [WDDE] , the fact that an act has [a bad event] as one of its intended effects does not invariably make the act impermissible, since there may be sufficiently strong countervailing reasons in favour of the act (or against the available alternatives) to make the act permissible after all.
While Wedgwood may be the first philosopher (so) explicitly to distinguish between these two formulations of DDE, he is not the first to defend the weaker formulation. Warren Quinn (1989) has already done so. Further, many (contemporary) defenses of DDE implicitly function (in part) as defenses of WDDE. A demonstration of an acute difficulty for WDDE, therefore, is of singular importance. 4 We need two (familiar) pairs of cases to root out the differences between these formulations. First, the Trolley/Transplant cases; second, the Trolley/Loop cases:
Trolley: Is it permissible to divert a runaway trolley about to kill five workers onto a side-track where it will kill only one? Transplant: Is it permissible to kill a healthy patient in order to use his organs to save five others who can survive only by receiving his heart, kidneys, etc.?
Trolley: As above. Loop: As Trolley, but the side-track on which the one worker is strapped loops around and rejoins the main track such that the trolley will kill the five workers from the other direction unless it is stopped by colliding with the one worker on the side-track.
The first pair of cases is wielded by defenders of DDE to support the relevance of intention to moral permissibility-classifications, while the second pair is wielded by opponents of DDE (see Thomson 1985 Thomson : 1402 to support the irrelevance of intention to moral permissibility-classifications. Each view claims intuition is on its side. I take it that it is a strength of any thesis to accommodate as broad a range of intuitive judgments as possible.
I take it that defenders of WDDE should say the following: The answer to Trolley and Transplant -each of which involves killing one to save five -is: yes and no, respectively. Relying on the intending/foreseeing distinction, such defenders will aver that the death of the single worker in Trolley is a merely foreseen effect of the diversion, while the death of the healthy patient in Transplant is an intended means to the end of saving the five. This difference in mental state explains the different permissibilityclassification of the two actions. Meanwhile, the answer to both Trolley and Loop -each of which, again, involves killing one to save five -is: yes. Although -paralleling Trolley/Transplant -the death of the single worker in Trolley is a merely foreseen effect of the diversion, while the death of the single worker in Loop is (we can stipulate) 5 an intended means to the end of saving the five, each action is -by contrast with Trolley/Transplant -intuitively permissible. This difference in mental state, while not resulting in a different permissibility-classification of the two actions, does nonetheless result in, and explain, the intuitive existence of stronger-reasonagainst the diversion in Loop. The diversion in Loop is still intuitively classed as permissible; but there is intuitively stronger-reason-against the 4 A full account of DDE would also specify the conditions under which it is permissible to bring about (unintended or even intended) bad events -for example, when the bad event is proportional to the good that can be achieved and there is no better way to achieve the good event. But I shall ignore this issue here. 5 Cf. Kamm (2000) . diversion than in Trolley. 6 Additionally, the diverter in Loop (and, indeed, the organ harvester in Transplant) may be blameworthy in a way the diverter in Trolley is not. Note: Opponents of DDE -see Thomson (1999) and Scanlon (2008) -claim that the addition of an intention to bring about a bad event is of (non-derivative) relevance only to assessment of the agent's character/decision-making/blameworthiness, and not additionally to the action's permissibility.
By contrast, defenders of SDDE, while able to concur with defenders of WDDE's explanation of Trolley/Transplant, do not have the resources to give the intuitive permissible classification of Loop. For SDDE, the diverter in Loop's intending of the bad event entails his act's impermissibility. In sum, while the Trolley/Loop pair is a counterexample to (the more crude) SDDE, it fails to be so to (the more refined) WDDE.
Assume, further, no (or: not many) counterintuitive permissibilityclassifications result from adoption of WDDE. Put differently, assume all (or: most of) its permissibility-classifications are intuitive. I take it that defenders of WDDE understand this to be sufficient for the success of their defense of WDDE.
WDDE's Explanatory Challenge
It follows, then, that we can describe Trolley/Transplant (and like pairs) as valency-shifting pairs, and Trolley/Loop (and like pairs) as non-valency-shifting pairs. And moving from Trolley to Transplant effects a valency-shift, while moving from Trolley to Loop effects no such shift. That is, the addition of an intention to bring about a bad event in the former pair results in a shift from permissible to impermissible action, but results in no such shift in the latter pair.
Note: The valency-shifting distinction has no relevance to SDDEfor defenders of SDDE all additions of an intention to bring about a bad event result in a shift in valency. 7 Put differently, there is no such thing as non-valency-shifting pairs for defenders of SDDE.
While the foregoing enables defenders of WDDE, but not defenders of SDDE, to give intuitive classifications of our two pairs of cases (and like pairs), it raises an explanatory challenge for defenders of WDDE, but not for defenders of SDDE: (VALENCY-SHIFT CHALLENGE) If WDDE is to be defensible, its defenders must give an explanation of the distinction between valency-shifting and non-valency-shifting pairs.
6 "I am not claiming that diverting the trolley in the Loop case is positively impermissible: I am just claiming that there is a stronger reason against diverting the trolley in the Loop case than in the original Trolley case, which either makes diverting the trolley impermissible, or at least takes it significantly closer to the line that divides permissibility and impermissibility." (Wedgwood, forthcoming: 4) 7 Where to add such an intention is to insert one where otherwise no such intention exists. Note that Cavanaugh (2006: 153) , a defender of SDDE, takes himself to have the resources to be able to distinguish between cases "[w]hile similar in terms of being impermissible...differ [ing] in terms of their wrongness," on account of alterations to intentions. And Cavanaugh makes a like point, mutatis mutandis, for permissible cases.
I take this to be a far from easy explanatory challenge for defenders of WDDE to meet. Absent such an explanation, however, WDDE is bound to seem jejune.
Possible Responses
Note in closing three responses to the challenge that will not work. Call a subject intending to bring about a bad event an actor, and a subject in receipt of said consequence a recipient.
First, one might think stipulating that the diverter in Loop diverts solely in order to kill the one worker on the side-track crosses the line from permissible to impermissible action. And the point would putatively generalize. Perhaps:
(MALEVOLENCE) A valency-shift occurs iff one switches to a malevolent actor -that is, to an actor only intending to bring about a bad event.
But malevolence cannot carry this burden. We can falsify (MA-LEVOLENCE) in both the left-right and right-left direction. For the left-right direction, which introduces nothing new, we need only reconsider Trolley/Transplant. Here we have a valency-shifting pair, without switching to a malevolent actor. For the right-left direction, pair Loop with:
Malevolent-Loop: As Loop, but the diverter diverts solely in order to kill the one worker on the side-track.
Here we have switched to a malevolent actor, but we have a nonvalency-shifting pair. If the diverter in Loop acts permissibly, so too does the diverter in Malevolent-Loop. Malevolence does not alter act evaluation. Making the actor malevolent only increases his blameworthiness.
Second, one might think that consent explains the valency-shifting distinction. Perhaps:
(CONSENT) A valency-shift occurs iff the recipient does not consent to the bad event.
But consent cannot carry this burden. We can falsify (CONSENT) in both the left-right and right-left direction. For the left-right direction, consider:
Consenting-Trolley: As Trolley, but the one worker consents to the diversion. Consenting-Transplant: As Transplant, but the healthy patient consents to the organ harvesting.
Here we have the recipients consenting in each case, within an intuitively valency-shifting pair: there are limits to the power of consent to render an otherwise impermissible act -viz. Transplant -permissible. For the right-left direction, which introduces nothing new, we need only re-consider Trolley/Loop. Here we have a non-valency-shifting pair, without the recipient consenting in either case.
Third, perhaps (suggested to me by Ralph Wedgwood):
(IMPOSSIBLE) A non-valency-shift occurs iff (i) it is in some fairly strong sense impossible for the actor to bring about the good event without doing so with an intention to bring about a bad event, and (ii) the consequences of every alternative action that does not involve bringing about that good event are significantly worse.
But to falsify (IMPOSSIBLE) in the left-right direction, reconsider Trolley/Loop and also:
